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What factors explain the wave of adoption of the ﬂat tax in Eastern Europe — a policy that was all but
unmentionable in the rest of the world? We argue that, once the ﬁrst few successes were underway, gov-
ernments with liberal outlooks toward taxation adopted the reform through a process of rational learning:
an often-radically new government will tend to adopt the policy based on successful implementation of
its neighbors. Our contribution to the literature on the political economy of taxation is threefold. First,
we show that, both theoretically and empirically, the existing work on taxation does not apply to the
ﬂat tax revolution in the post-communist countries. Second, we take into consideration the need and
the diﬃculty of measuring ideology of Eastern European political parties. Third, we approach the issue
of policy diﬀusion by explicitly modeling the diﬀerent mechanisms that might underlie the process. We
also ﬁnd that the presence of other market-minded reforms do not predict adoption of the ﬂat tax.
11 Introduction
In the past century, the ﬂat tax seemed consigned to the category of potentially desir-
able but politically unattainable reform. Widely believed by neoliberal economists to
oﬀer huge revenue gains, both by reducing bureaucracy and increasing payments, it had
been repeatedly deemed too tough a sell to voting publics who wanted to be taxed only
according to their level of income.
But that all changed in 1994, when Estonia’s youthful, liberal government pushed
through a ﬂat tax of 26 percent. Taken alone, this might have been just an anomaly, as
the government had instated a basket of reforms that was the stuﬀ of neoliberal dreams,
including zero-tariﬀ trade. Furthermore, small, open economies such as Hong Kong and
the UK’s Channel Islands had also embraced the ﬂat tax (in 1947 and 1994, respectively)
but did not have any followers.1 But within a year, Estonia’s Baltic neighbors followed
suit. Ten years on, close to a dozen countries in Eastern Europe have joined the ﬂat tax
revolution, and several more seem poised to do so.2
How did governments as diverse as underachieving Romania, dynamic Slovakia, and
rapidly growing yet far from liberal Russia push through this reform, long considered to
be politically too sensitive to tackle? Researchers interested in extraordinary politics in
the developing world are confronted with a dilemma. Most of the empirical work on the
determinants of particular economic reforms has been done on OECD countries. The
assumptions underlying those models may not be relevant for the developing countries,
because of structural diﬀerences in those countries economies as well as in their politics.
Furthermore, the literature on taxation is more concerned with predicting the levels of tax
1Hong Kong’s is not a pure ﬂat tax; it has diﬀerent marginal tax rates for a few diﬀerent levels of
income.
2The countries are, in order of adoption, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro,
Ukraine, Slovakia, Georgia, Romania, and Albania.
2under various circumstances, not on the adoption of particular tax regimes. Finally, diﬀu-
sion processes have long been a subject of research in the social sciences, but empirically
identifying the causal mechanism behind the spread of ideas has proven challenging.
We join the literature on the implementation of economic reforms that ﬁnds that
politics matters for economic policy adoption.3 We take the adoption of the ﬂat tax in
Eastern Europe as a natural experiment, where a rare constellation of a ﬂuid environment
for policy change as well as policy competition created conditions that made adopting
the ﬂat tax persuasive. In fact, the policy’s obvious ﬁt for the circumstances of the region
made the case for adoption rationally compelling to policymakers. Though it is almost
impossible to identify the trigger for the ﬁrst country to adopt the ﬂat tax, prediction
becomes somewhat easier once diﬀusion kicks in.
We draw from the literature on the determinants of taxation as well as the literature
on policy reform more generally to model the adoption of the ﬂat tax as a process of
policymakers’ rational learning. Tax systems are vastly complex, and empirical and
formal work – not all of it uniﬁed – has been done on taxation levels, value-added tax,
social transfers, the ability to collect taxes, and non-tax incentives to attract revenue.
Here we focus on the adoption of the ﬂat tax as a previously rare event that now is close
to becoming the standard for the region. We ﬁnd that other types of policy reform do not
predict adoption of the ﬂat tax, nor do most of the variables in the standard models of
taxation levels (save capital mobility). Given the right ideological environment, the ﬂat
tax has taken oﬀ in Eastern Europe not as a result of blind imitation, but by policymakers
rationally updating their beliefs about the tax’s appropriateness for their own country.
3For example, on central-bank independence, see Franzese (1999) and Lohmann (2000); Franzese
& Hays (2006) on labor market reforms; and Leblang (1999) and Cohen (1998) on determinants of
exchange-rate regimes.
3This ﬁnding contributes to the literature on diﬀusion and the ability of policies as well
as ideas to cross borders, a topic that has been of concern to social sciences in the past
several decades and has recently been tackled by political methodologists.4 We also join
the emerging literature on the determinants of policy diﬀusion.5
Note that we leave aside analyses of the impact of the ﬂat tax on individual and state
welfare, on the distributive implications of a ﬂat tax, or on the merits or demerits of
tax competition. Our goal is to focus on the ﬂat tax as a policy instrument, and as an
example of policy reform that was transmitted intraregionally rather than externally —
unusually for countries in transition, where reform measures are often undertaken at the
behest of the EU or an international ﬁnancial institution. Thus, we seek to understand
the implementation of the ﬂat tax in the broader context of inﬂuences on policy reform,
both exogenous and ideological (Williamson, 1994; Haggard & Kaufman, 1990; Rodrik,
1996; Swank & Steinmo, 2002; Swank, 2006).
Also, because of the region of focus, our work sits most comfortably in the strain of
recent literature that seeks to use taxation as a means of understanding the nature of
the modern state and its authority over its citizens (Bates & Lien, 1985; Tilly, 1975).
Marginal taxation rates in general are a widely used proxy for the overall direction of
ﬁscal policy (Lieberman, 2002). For developing countries, many of which suﬀer from weak
state capacity, this is a particularly salient concern, and many researchers in comparative
politics have focused on governments’ ability to extract revenue from its citizens, as a
4For just a few examplesn economics, see Axelrod (1986); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992).
In political science, see O’Loughlin et al (1998), Tam Cho (2002); Gleditsch & Ward (2000, 2006); Beck
et al. (2006); Franzese & Hays (2006); Darmofal (2006).
5See Simmons & Elkins (2004); Brune & Guisinger (2006); Volden & Shipan (2006); Lutz & Sikkink
(2000). Most saliently, in a recent paper, Swank (2006) investigated the dynamics of diﬀusion of the
neoliberal tax policies in the OECD countries and found that highly visible tax reforms in the U.S. were
important in instigating subsequent tax policy diﬀusion, but policy changes were constrained by domestic
politics and political economy structures.
4proxy for their overall aptitude.6
Our analysis starts with a background on the trajectory of the ﬂat tax revolution in
Eastern Europe. We then turn to the literature on taxation and policy reform to show the
inadequacy of not only taxation studies but also of many of the most inﬂuential works on
diﬀusion in explaining the ﬂat tax wave in post-communist countries. After a discussion of
the data as well as the methods used to analyze it, we test two models’ ability to explain
variation in the adoption of the ﬂat tax, taking into account these alternate theories.
We ﬁnd strong support for a rational learning framework of diﬀusion: an often-radically
new government will tend to adopt the policy based on successful implementation of its
neighbors. The last section concludes with a discussion of policy implications and steps
for future research.
2 Flatliners
First, a deﬁnition: a ﬂat tax regime means that every taxpayer is taxed at one, typically
low, rate. The arguments in favor are several, including incentives to pay rather than to
evade, as well as a reduction of costs in processing. In the 19th century most countries
had a system of ﬂat taxation, but the 20th century witnessed the gradual growth of the
welfare state, with a majority of countries converging on progressive taxation.
Although the ﬂat tax idea has been championed extensively among many libertarian
economists, as well as discussed in the context of debates on tax cuts at the national
policy level in the U.S. and other advanced democracies (Hall & Rabushka, 1995), it has
been dismissed as politically infeasible, usually because potential taxpayers at the lower
end of the spectrum want to be taxed less themselves, and to have the rich bearing a
6See Chaudry (1997) on the Middle East and Cheibub (1998) on Africa.
5greater share of the payment burden. The welfare states of Western Europe also fear a
race to the bottom, as countries compete for mobile international investment by oﬀering
ever lower tax levels and, thus, greater return to that investment. Additionally, it was
believed that a ﬂat tax would create marginal disincentives to work and invest (Romich,
2006).
But what was deemed impossible in the entrenched welfare states of Western Europe
seems to have become an imperative in the ﬂuid context of economic transformation in
the East. Estonia was the ﬁrst to introduce a comprehensive tax reform in 1994, together
with a ﬂat tax of 26 percent. After his election victory of 1992, the then-32-year-old
Mart Laar led his conservative-liberal coalition to push through many diﬃcult shock-
therapy reforms, guided by an extremely liberal economic outlook. Ignoring IMF advice
to increase taxation levels in the existing system of graduated tax rates, Estonia instead
implemented a ﬂat income tax of 26 percent. In the words of Laar, “Especially in a tran-
sition country, where the economy has to move from a fully government-controlled system
to a market-based one, it is very important to free the private initiative and give freedom
of action to create economic value. The government must not punish entrepreneurial
people; it has to encourage them, also through the tax system. The government must
ensure fair play only.”7 Estonia was swiftly followed by Lithuania and Latvia in their
ﬁscal reforms the following year.
In 2001 the newly minted government of President Vladimir Putin of Russia replaced
the previous three-bracket system with a top rate of 30 percent, with a low ﬂat rate of 13
percent ﬂat personal tax, followed by a 24 percent corporate tax in 2002. Russia has long
suﬀered from widespread tax evasion and the new simpliﬁed tax system aimed at making
7“The Cradle of the European Tax Rebellion: Estonia,” TSC Daily, 13 Oct 2004.
6it easier to pay than to risk cheating.8 One senior government tax oﬃcial estimated that
before the ﬂat tax took eﬀect at the beginning of 2001, Russians on average had declared
as little as 25 percent of their income.9 Ukraine swiftly followed suit, introducing a ﬂat
individual income tax of 13 percent, and reducing the tax rate on corporate proﬁts from
30 to 25 percent.
The trend continued with Serbia introducing in 2003 a 14 percent ﬂat tax rate on
personal income and corporate proﬁts, making it the lowest corporate proﬁt tax rate
in Europe. Serbia had 106 diﬀerent taxes before introducing the ﬂat tax—one of the
ﬁrst reforms the new government instituted.10 Slovakia (whose prime minister Mikloˇ s
Dˇ zurinda frequently cited Estonia’s Laar as a mentor) adopted a 19 percent ﬂat income
and corporate tax rate on Jan 1, 2004, replacing an old system that included 90 exceptions,
19 sources of un-taxed income, 66 tax-exempt items, and 27 items with speciﬁc tax rates.
In 2005, ﬂat tax reform continued to roll with Romania and Georgia going ﬂat.
[FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE]
Figure One shows the variation in individual taxation levels in the postcommunist
countries. The top marginal income tax rates have declined in the past 15 years, from
40.9 on average in 1993 (standard deviation 7.56) to 28.9 (standard deviation 11.92) in
2005, yet the average rate was relatively stable in 1990s, and there are no visible regional
diﬀerences between EU accession states and the others. For example, the countries with
the highest levels of taxation are relatively rich EU member Slovenia and unreformed
Belarus.
In a possible reversal of the policy catch-up that was part of EU accession, some
8As discussed in the theory section, this is a common motivation for adopting a ﬂat tax in Eastern
Europe; data on tax evasion as well as tax compliance are unfortunately diﬃcult to come by, however,
so veriﬁcation of these claims is largely anecdotal.
9“A Flat Tax Is Taking Root in, of All Places, Russia.” Newsweek, May 26, 2003
10Author interview, Dragana Djurica, SIEPA investment agency, 18 July 2006.
7western countries might follow the suit from the East, due to the obvious investment
attraction of its Eastern neighbors and the global competition for capital. There are
indications that Finland, Germany and Spain are currently discussing the ﬂat tax idea.11
Additionally, there are indications that ﬂat-tax domino eﬀect is still at work in the East.12
Serious discussions are underway to implement a ﬂat tax in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
and Poland.13 Across the border from “ﬂat” Slovakia, the shadow ﬁnance minister of the
Czech Republic, Vlastimil Tlust´ y of the center-right Civic Democratic Party, has drawn
up plans for an integrated 15 percent ﬂat tax on corporations and individuals, a reduction
from the current top rates of 29 percent and 31 percent respectively. According to former
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb´ an, leader of the main conservative opposition party
FIDESZ, Budapest will have “no choice” but to jump on the “ﬂat tax bandwagon” in order
to maintain the country’s competitiveness and retain a fair share of foreign investments.14
3 Economic and Political Arguments for Tax Reform
What factors inﬂuenced this diverse group of countries, across regions and income levels,
to adopt the ﬂat tax? We turn now to three families of arguments on the adoption of the
ﬂat tax, broadly divisible into categories of economics, both domestic and international;
domestic politics, including policy ﬂexibility and government ideology; and diﬀusion,
focusing particularly on rational learning. It should be noted that these arguments are
11In fact, the ﬂat tax trial balloon could have cost the CDU their expected margin of victory in the
2005 elections: Paul Kirchhof, a strong advocate of the ﬂat tax who was suggested as a possible ﬁnance
minister by CDU/CSU, caused widespread controversy and had to leave politics.
12“The Outlook for Tax Competition,” Andrew Quinlan, The Sovereign Individual, March 2005.
13Indeed, Poland could have become the 11th ﬂat country had the outcome of a close election swung
the other way. During the 2005 electoral campaign, Civic Platform, a liberal-conservative opposition
party, advocated a 15 percent ﬂat tax rate in order to catch up with Slovakia (which has a ﬂat tax rate
of 19 percent), but lost the elections in a last-minute shift in the polls.
14 “Tax developments in the European Union since 2004 Enlargement.” Svetlana Menn, Tax Planning
International Review, November 2005.
8not mutually exclusive, and many studies use similar variables to explain taxation levels,
if not tax reform per se.
3.1 International and Domestic Economic Arguments
There has been little empirical work on the determinants of ﬂat tax adoption, largely
because so few countries have adopted this form of taxation regime. Most scholarly
work has focused instead on whether such a tax would oﬀer gains to an economy in
practice (Weisbach, 2000). Within the broader literature on the political economy of
taxation, researchers have tended to ﬁnd inﬂuence of domestic budgetary concerns as
well as international competition. On the domestic side, countries with a high level of
government spending will need relatively high levels of taxation to oﬀset that debt. That
government debt is a result of multiple pressures from the economy, including structural
unemployment and an ageing population that is out of the workforce (Kormendi, 1983;
Webb, 1985; Frenkel & Razin, 1985; Cukierman & Meltzer, 1988; Alesina & Tabellini,
1990; Swank & Steinmo, 2002; Swank, 2002). A country’s competitiveness internationally
also matters, both directly, as will be discussed below in the section on diﬀusion. Openness
to trade and capital may increase the incentives of a country to develop a low taxation
regime, to increase the competitiveness of their exporting sectors (Garrett & Mitchell,
2001). There is certainly reason to believe that taxes as a source of revenue were a concern
in Eastern Europe: in the Western Newly Independent States, for example, the shrinking
of the traditional tax bases and the problems in collecting taxes, added with the rise of
the black-market economy (Hemming, Cheasty, & Lahiri, 1995).
There is, however, a problem in applying these arguments wholesale to the case of
ﬂat-tax adoption. They deal primarily with how diﬀerent levels of taxation ought to aﬀect
9certain outcomes, such as ﬁnancing, growth, and investment. Those arguments ought to
hold true across cases and time: for example, the need to attract FDI does not speak to
why a country would adopt that particular ﬂat taxation regime, at the particular time
at which is was adopted. We would want a theory that predicts why governments picked
that particular ﬂat tax tool rather than some other policy tool, such as eliminating sales
tax or setting other taxes higher. Thus, we will include the variables suggested by this
literature only as controls, and turn instead to political variables for greater illumination.
3.2 Domestic political variables
First, government ideology seems a clear suspect for implementing the ﬂat tax, an idea
that is the darling of classical liberals and ﬁscal conservatives – what would be considered
on the right end of the political spectrum in OECD countries. But political parties in
Eastern Europe are often diﬃcult to categorize in broad left-right strokes; many espouse
a mix of diﬀerent ideologies depending on the issue area. Indeed, at the time of adoption,
in almost all “ﬂat” countries at least one party in the coalition espoused economic liberal
ideas (such as the Estonian Liberal Democratic Union or Serbian G17+) and/or there
was a drastic change of government from left to right (Georgia and Romania). In Russia
and Ukraine the incumbents and the parties supporting them in the parliaments were
hardly liberal, yet based on the policies they supported they were clearly on the economic
right. Thus, any empirical investigation must pay close attention to whether governmental
ideology can be deﬁned by a left-right continuum.
We also expect that rapid changes in ideology — that is, when reform governments
come to power — would be associated with the adoption of ﬂat tax regimes. Olson
(2000) discussed why certain economies grew quickly after major societal shocks such
10as wars or revolutions. Major shocks, he argued, broke up powerful vested interests
that had previously blocked change, allowing new leaders to come to the fore. This
would help explain why Slovakia, Serbia and Georgia, and to a large extent, Romania,
which experienced drastic government changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s, were
more quick to jump on tax reform than were, say, Hungary or the Czech Republic. The
strength of the center-right after the toppling of the autocratic regimes of Vladimir Meˇ ciar,
Slobodan Miloˇ sevi´ c, and Eduard Shevardnadze had freer reign for policy experimentation,
once the way was already paved by the Baltic countries (though Slovakia took some
time to implement reforms due to the instability of the governing coalition). These
countries thus were able to skip intermediary reform stages and could implement radical
tax reforms, hereby overtaking more advanced economies with many vested interests.
Thus, policymakers may have viewed the ﬂat-tax reform as a strong and visible signal of
a country’s investor-friendly “type.”
Because of the very highly visible and widely discussed ﬂat-tax adoption in Estonia,
a country that proved the most successful economy in Eastern Europe, if not Europe as
a whole — in 2005 it ranked 12th most economically free in the world by the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and ﬁrst in Eastern Europe — other countries,
especially those with new liberal governments that needed to make for the lost years under
previous governments, saw ﬂat-tax adoption as a shortcut, or a signal. Because of the
ﬂat tax policy’s strong association with economic liberalism and the Estonian economic
success, transition under-achievers used the ﬂat tax to project their new reform-oriented
and liberal credentials, regardless of whether the ﬂat tax would ultimately prove a success.
It could also be argued that if other economic policy changes such as privatization
and price liberalization were enacted at the same time as the ﬂat tax, it might indicate a
11greater penchant for reform in a ruling government, as well as public tolerance for reform.
Thus, it is possible that the presence of other reforms would make it more likely for us
to observe a government’s adoption of the ﬂat tax.
Additionally, there is broad agreement that, regardless of the ideological stripe of the
policy in question, the diﬃculty of changing policies increases with the number of “veto
players” who must agree to the changes (North & Weingast, 1989; Alesina & Tabellini,
1998; Henisz, 1999, 2000, & 2004; Tsebelis, 2000). This has proven true in a number
of diﬀerent environments: political constraints – be they coalition partners or political
institutions – lead to policy stability, for better or for worse. Most recent empirical studies
of policy change now take into account the presence of political constraints or checks
and balances (Henisz, 2002; Stasavage, 2000), including on taxation levels (Hallberg &
Basinger, 1999, 2004).
Thus, we can posit the above in the following hypotheses:
• H1: An economically liberal ideology should increase the probability of adopting
the ﬂat tax.
• H2: The enactment of other economic reforms should increase the probability of
adopting the ﬂat tax.
• H3: A greater number of veto players should decrease the probability of adopting
the ﬂat tax.
123.3 Diﬀusion
Diﬀusion is a phenomenon long observed in the social sciences.15 The mechanism for
these patterns is often ill-deﬁned, both theoretically and empirically. It can be diﬃcult
to distinguish among imitation, learning, socialization, herd behavior, contagion, or any
of the other commonly named drivers of diﬀusion, as many of those mechanisms generate
similar predictions about how individuals would behave in the face of a fad.
One probable mechanism for the adoption of the ﬂat tax is rational learning. In
rational learning, individual countries’ policies can converge on “a promising foreign model
... [through which] systematic, thorough cost-beneﬁt analysis demonstrates its superiority
over established policies.”16 This is the bedrock of the rational choice perspective, that
individuals make informed judgements about their options, and through calculating their
payoﬀs in all circumstances move toward the least painful one. In the laboratory of reform
in postcommunist Europe, policymakers could learn from other countries’ successes and
failures. After observing the success of the ﬂat tax in attracting FDI and encouraging
tax collection, policymakers facing similar pressures would move to adopt the tax.
Governments in the post-communist countries borrowed shamelessly from the suc-
cesses of other countries. Not just international organizations but also NGOs promoted
this practice, through umpteen cross-border conferences that highlighted transition suc-
cesses and failures, as well as exchange programs that put ministers and policymakers in
15For just a few examples, see Case & Katz (1991) on how, for example, criminal activity and drug
abuse patterns tend to be replicated within neighborhoods, as a result of “collective socialization” and
“contagion”; Gleditsch & Ward (2006) on democratic diﬀusion; Gleditsch 2003 on civil wars; Brune &
Guisinger (2003) on capital-account openness; Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) and Cortell & Davis (1996)
on the spread of international norms; Rogers 1962 on the spread of innovations; Orenstein (2003) on
the spread of pension reforms; Berry and Berry (1990), and Volden and Shipan (2006), on the spread
of lotteries and anti-smoking policies in U.S. states, respectively; Simmons & Elkins (2004) on the
international spread of liberalization; Lutz & Sikkink (2000), Sikkink & Walling (2006), and Kim (2005),
on “cascades” in justice (holding heads of state accountable for past abuses)
16Weyland (2005) p. 271.
13the oﬃces of their foreign counterparts (Carothers, 1999). Countless well-attended confer-
ences on “lessons learned” from other countries’ experiences in economic reform abounded
throughout the region, providing a direct opportunity for policymakers to learn about the
workings of the ﬂat-tax.
One of the main architects of the Slovak ﬂat tax reforms, L’udovit ´ Odor, described
the presence of the ﬂat tax reform in the prosperous Baltic countries as an empirical
illustration for the reform. The ﬂat tax had in fact been on the party platform of two of
the parties in the Dˇ zurinda coalition. “There was huge political will to have a simpler
tax system. ... We considered many reforms in those days, and the test cases in the
Baltics and Russia provided some data points for the reform,” he says. “It is very hard
to compare regions, but ﬁnally we had some empirical evidence that the ﬂat tax worked
in some cases. So we took the basic idea and then analyzed how far we could go with
it.”17 This supports the rational learning framework—in fact, Odor is a self-described
good friend of Estonia’s Laar, and consulted him extensively throughout the period of
adopting the tax.
Another motivation for ﬂat-tax adoption is to encourage domestic collection of taxes.
Compliance with tax payments after the introduction of the reform has been widespread
and by some accounts staggering; one economist estimated a 79.7 percent increase in
Russian tax revenues after the introduction of the ﬂat tax.18 As a recent IMF report put
it, “the common circumstances and tax practices of these countries — creating market
economies with little experience of tax payment by individuals and largely dysfunctional
tax administrations — are relatively conducive to beneﬁcial compliance eﬀects” (Keen,
17Author interview, L’udovit ´ Odor, National Bank of Slovakia, 23 July 2006.
18Alvin Rabushka, “The Flat Tax at Work in Russia: Year Three.” Hoover Institute comment, 26
April 2004.
14Kim & Varsano, 2006). Though there are unfortunately no reliable data on eﬀective
tax collection, we can account for the attractiveness of neighboring countries through
their success in drawing in international capital. Multinational corporations hoping to
take advantage of the region’s high levels of education and relatively cheap labor might
be further swayed by favorable tax regimes.19 Therefore, competition for foreign direct
investment as well as for mobile capital may well be inﬂuential in a government’s decision
to adopt the ﬂat tax.
Thus, we can set up a hypothesis for diﬀusion:
• H4: The presence of diﬀusion would increase the probability of ﬂat tax adoption,
through policymakers’ rational observance of the increasing attractiveness of ﬂat-
tax countries.
Another schematic for thinking about diﬀusion is that countries would adopt a reform
either because of pressure from powerful actors (the IMF, World Bank, or European
Union)20 This seems not to apply in the case under study here. As mentioned, the
IMF explicitly opposed Estonia’s adoption of the ﬂat tax. In terms of other sources of
external pressure, with the Central European and Baltic countries already in the EU,
after a decade of reform and negotiation, and many in the Balkans poised to formally
begin talks with Brussels, EU accession has been one of the driving sources of reform in
the region over the past 15 years. But whatever else in Western Europe was attractive,
the social welfare states and attendant high taxation were certainly not what that the
postcommunist countries strove to emulate. Even though nearly all the countries in the
region were oriented toward EU accession, the ﬂat-tax reform was not a component of
19This would be reﬂected more strongly in corporate taxation levels, but individual taxation regimes
serve as a feasible proxy.
20For illustration, see Stallings (1992), Simmons (2001), or Henisz, Zellner and Guillen (2005).
15negotiations — in fact, the Central European and Baltic states are being pressured to
dismantle their tax systems now that they have become EU members. Thus, though
the EU as well as international ﬁnancial institutions are often the drivers of reform in
developing countries, it may be that proximity to the EU would make a country less likely
to champion a ﬂat tax. The expectation here is mixed.
Other research that attempts to specify the mechanism behind spreads and fashions
has often rejected rational learning in favor of a more pessimistic view of human nature.
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992, 1998) call these processes “informational cas-
cades,” noting that after a certain point in the cascades, adoptees stop accumulating new
information and simply adopt the trend blindly. Similarly, Weyland (2005) attributes
the geographic and temporal pattern and substantive nature of pension reform in Latin
America to “cognitive heuristics.”21 Empirically as well as anecdotally, we hope to show
that this is not the case for Eastern Europe.
We posit that countries signal their business-friendly ‘type’ to potential investors by
adopting ﬂat taxation. In turn, this adoption leads to increases in FDI inﬂows to “ﬂat”
countries and the latter and their policies become more attractive in the eyes of their peer
group, in addition to foreign investors. On average, “ﬂat” countries receive 4.3 percent of
their GDP in FDI inﬂows after adoption, while non-ﬂat countries receive 2.5 percent.22
Also, on average, FDI inﬂows increase by 2.5 percent after country adopts ﬂat tax. As
21Weyland delineates among four diﬀerent theoretical frameworks that characterize diﬀusion processes,
including external pressure, normative imitation, rational learning, and cognitive heuristics, championing
the latter to explain most aspects of diﬀusion. Policymakers, he argues, adopted the reform not through
a process of sober consideration, but through a three-fold psychological process in which, once an idea
becomes available, individuals place exaggerated stock in a measure’s superiority and adopt it wholesale,
regardless of its appropriateness for their own context. He also describes the temporal pattern of diﬀusion
as an S-shaped curve, mapping a surge and then a levelling of policy adoption. It remains to be seen
whether the path of the ﬂat tax will take this shape, since, as we note below, ideology is also an important
predictor of adoption, and indeed many opposition parties in both Eastern and Western Europe have
dropped hints about the reform.
22Standard deviations are 2.7 and 2.7, respectively.
16a result, non-ﬂat countries will emulate their more successful peers and be inclined to
adopt ﬂat taxation.
The next section turns to the tests of these hypotheses on the likelihood of adoption
of the ﬂat tax regime.
4 Model Speciﬁcation
In this section we isolate the rational learning pattern of diﬀusion from correlated domestic
or external sources of that trend. We collect data from 20 Eastern European and EU
applicant countries over a period of ﬁfteen years, from 1990 to 2005; as such, the unit
of analysis here is country-year. We confronted the potential bias caused by listwise
deletion in the face of missing observations in our dataset by using Amelia (Honaker,
Joseph, King, Scheve, & Singh, 2003) to impute for missing values based on patterns
in the existing observations.23 Reported coeﬃcients and standard errors are averaged
across ten imputed datasets. To correct for the serial correlation that plagues time-series,
cross-section datasets, we employ year ﬁxed eﬀects, which also aid in ensuring that our
results are not simply due to idiosyncracies of a particular year.24
In measuring ideology, we use expert survey data (Benoit & Laver, 2006) (in 2003
the surveys were applied to all countries in Eastern Europe, inter alia).25 For each
23Observations were not missing at random; earlier years as well as less-developed countries tended
to have more missing values. This pattern makes it feasible to employ imputation based on existing
relationships in the observed data. There was 16 percent missingness in our base model for imputation.
24Because of the high degree of correlation with our diﬀusion variables, we do not employ country
or region ﬁxed eﬀects; it is superior to substantively model space rather than just to include dummy
variables. Due to this diversity of ﬂat tax countries and a battery of parameters which account for country
characteristics in the model speciﬁcation, we feel suﬃciently conﬁdent that we address Galton’s problem
(1889) and are able to distinguish between eﬀects arising out of diﬀusion and those out of clustering and
domestic characteristics.
25There are several ways of measuring party policy positions, including methods based on content
analysis (Budge et al., 2001), roll call voting patters (Hix et al., 2005; Poole, 2005; Poole & Rosenthal,
1997), computerized word scoring techniques (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003; Benoit & Laver, 2003) or
opinion surveys (Hug & Konig, 2002; Konig & Slapin, 2004), all of which have their advantages. But in
17substantive policy dimension, each party was placed on a scale describing its position,
using the Laver-Hunt (1992) metric of 1 to 20, with 1 generally corresponding the “left”
position. To account for the impact of ideology on tax policy changes, we used Economic
(Spending v. Taxes) policy dimension, with the following two extremes: (1) Promotes
raising taxes to increase public services, and (20) Promotes cutting public services to cut
taxes.
For governmental ideology, we use data from Benoit and Laver for 2000s, and Huber
and Inglehart (1995) for the 1990s. In case of coalitions, we used the average coalition
score, weighted by seats. We standardized the 10-point scale in the latter study make
it be equivalent with the 20-point scale of Benoit and Laver. Though it would be ideal
to have the same ideology data for all years, we checked for robustness by matching the
economic left-right positions of parties from Benoit and Laver with those of Huber and
Inglehart, the positions were within three points diﬀerence at most.26 For consistency, we
also included in some of the estimations indicators of party families (whether governing
parties were liberal or conservative).27 The problem with using party families in the
context of Eastern Europe is that economic liberals are not necessarily social liberals.28
In keeping with the above hypotheses, we model diﬀusion in a few diﬀerent ways.
First, we measure regional competition for mobile investment, by calculating a country’s
FDI as a share of that in its region (divided into Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the
order to adjudicate the substantive validity of the results, expert knowledge can provide key insights and
serve as benchmarks that give some systematic sense of the validity of alternative measures. (Benoit &
Laver, forthcoming; Chapter 3 discusses this in detail)
26Basinger and Hallenberg (2004) used Laver and Hunt (1992) to estimate party ideology for 1980-97,
thus they estimated party positions in 1980 using data collected in early 1990s. We think it preferable to
use estimators collected for respective decades, instead of applying Benoit and Lavers data retrospectively.
27 Chapel Hill Party Dataset 2002, taken from Gary Marks’s website. The estimation is omitted in
this paper, please, contact authors if interested.
28Indeed, in the post-communist countries, unlike in the West, positioning on social liberalism is
typically orthogonal to positioning on economic policy positioning.See Whiteﬁeld and Evans (1994), who
found correlations between social and economic indices of just 0.33. See also Kitschelt (1999), p. 67.
18Balkans, and the Baltics). Second, we measure the spread of policy ideas by counting
the number of countries that have implemented the ﬂat tax, for the regressions on ﬂat
tax, and calculating the average tax levels for the region, for the robustness checks on
levels of individual taxation. We discuss these diﬀusion eﬀects in more detail below.
These eﬀects are estimated by the binary time-series cross-section model with temporal
controls (Beck et al., 1998; Beck et. al., 2001; Epstein et al., 2001). The model is thus a
duration-dependent logit (restricted Markov transition) model.
Finally, following Franzese and Hays (2006), we specify a spatio-temporal lag model
that includes weighted spatial lags to test whether policymakers observed and reacted to
tax policy change in neighboring countries. To assess whether countries blindly adopted
the policy or whether they did so on the basis of rationally evaluating the increasing
attractiveness of nearby ﬂat-tax countries, we weigh each neighboring ﬂat country by
FDI inﬂows. Thus, tax policy change in a country becomes a function of past ﬂat-tax
adoption in a neighboring country, as well as FDI competition. Each spatio-temporal lag
model also includes other measures of diﬀusion, described above.29
The full spatio-temporal lag model to analyze the diﬀusion of ﬂat tax policies through-
out Central and Eastern Europe is:
Pi,t =
exp(αYi,t−1 + ρWYi,t−1 + γ¯ nYt−1 + Xi,t−1β + i,t
1 + exp(αYi,t−1 + ρWYi,t−1 + γ¯ nYt−1 + Xi,t−1β + i,t
where Yi,t−1 is a one-period temporal lag of the dependent variable and α is the
temporal-autoregressive coeﬃcient; W is an NxN spatial-weighting (standardized in-
29See Gleditsch & Ward, 2006 estimation of democratic diﬀusion using four diﬀerent measures of the
latter).
19verted distance) matrix; WYi,t−1 is the spatial lag, which gives a weighted sum of Yj,t−1
for each Yi,t−1; ρ is the spatial-autoregressive coeﬃcient; ¯ nYt−1 is the ‘diﬀusion’ lag,
where ¯ n is the number of ‘ﬂat’ countries in a given year; γ is the temporal-diﬀusion coef-
ﬁcient; X is a matrix of observations on the independent variables and β is the vector of
its coeﬃcients;  is the residual vector. The temporal-autoregressive coeﬃcient α shifts
depending on the value of Yi,t−1 (1 or 0). We assume that all variables X have the same
independent eﬀect on the dependent variable irrespective of the value of Yi,t−1, but α
captures the diﬀerence between eﬀects arising from the transition from 0 to 1 (ﬂat tax
adoption) and those from 1 to 1 (ﬂat tax persistence), by α. Thereby we can distinguish
between the impact of diﬀusion (adoption) and attraction, the probability of ﬂat tax
adoption given its persistence.
We construct W, a standardized inverted distance matrix, to specify diﬀusion via
distance, with zeros along the diagonal and elements Wij reﬂecting the degree of con-
nectedness from country j to i.30 Due to the diversity of ﬂat tax countries, we forsake
alternative speciﬁcations of this matrix on the basis of EU membership status or regions
and construct a distance matrix instead.
We estimate the spatial lag with no substantive weights, and we also weigh WYi,t−1
by a variable that we expect to register the attractiveness of ‘ﬂat’ countries to ‘non-ﬂat’
countries: competition for foreign direct investment (measured as the ratio of a country’s
FDI to that of its immediate region). We estimate separately several models: without
spatial eﬀects, with spatial eﬀects, and with spatial eﬀects weighted by FDI (all including
30Each value in the matrix represents the distance between all capital cities in Eastern Europe. The
values are inverted so that neighboring countries register higher values of Wij and each row is standardized
by dividing each cell in a row by that row’s sum, as common in the literature. Since we have 20 countries
in the dataset, the NxN matrix is 20x20. To compare and discuss short-run spatial eﬀects in neighboring
countries (Table 3), we also specify a border-contiguity matrix, with bordering countries coded as 1, 0
otherwise, and row-standardized as above. These two speciﬁcations produce very similar results.
20FDI as the independent variable). If the latter model proves to be a better predictor
than the former, it will suggest that rational observation of the attractiveness of ﬂat tax
countries does contribute to the explanation of a ﬂat tax revolution.
We use these variables to estimate two diﬀerent classes of models. The ﬁrst (Table
1) models the overall reform environment, as described in Hypothesis Six. For this,
we use measures of total revenue from privatization (Privatization), denominated in US
dollars (Brune, 2005); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development measures
of current-account liberalization (Current-acct liberalization) and the removal of price
controls (Price liberalization) (EBRD, 1990-2005), and measures of institutional reform
(Kostadinova, 2005). We also control for the ability to enact policy reform by including
a measure of veto players (Political Constraints) and for capital-account openness. We
also model the pull from Europe in terms of geography. We use the standard measure of
kilometers from the Rhein valley (Km from Rhein) as a proxy for the pull of European
commerce and culture, as is common in the literature (Sachs, 1999). The second (Table 2)
uses many of the standard control variables that test arguments about taxation levels —
but again, not adoption of particular taxation regimes. Both models include all measures
of diﬀusion as well as economically liberal government leanings (Ideology).
Results in Table One show the results of a logit model on the adoption of the ﬂat tax
in a given country year (coded 0 if the tax was not adopted and 1 if it was).
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE]
As suspected, none of the reform measures here have consistently signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the probability of ﬂat tax adoption, though capital-account openness does. An economi-
cally liberal ideology, however, is associated with statistically signiﬁcant increases in the
probability of ﬂat tax adoption. That the coeﬃcient on ideology proves strong indicates
21the primacy of rational learning over cognitive heuristics; in the case of the latter, all
governments would adopt the reform regardless of their ideological bent. All four ways of
modeling diﬀusion also have impact: proximity to Western Europe has positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. The number of ﬂat tax countries in a given year (Diﬀusion)
has the strongest eﬀects, which are mitigated only slightly by including the spatial lags
in the model. On its own, the eﬀects of FDI competition are not statistically diﬀerent
from zero, but weighing the spatial lag by FDI competition has substantively less strong
but statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, suggesting the pull of interdependence among those
neighboring ﬂat-tax countries.
Next we control for ﬂat-tax adoption through modeling the predictions on the litera-
ture on optimal levels of taxation. To correctly specify our model, following Swank and
Steinmo 2002, we control for overall productivity, (GDP per capita, Income) structural
unemployment as a share of GDP (Unemployment), and the demands placed on the pub-
lic sector through measuring both public sector debt (Public Debt) and the percent of
the population aged 65 and older (Percent Elderly). We control for international eco-
nomic pressures by including openness to the world economy, as measured by trade as a
share of GDP (Trade); we expect that greater openness to trade would lead to reduced
or simpliﬁed tax systems to boost competitiveness (Garrett, 1998). We include capital-
account openness to further take into account the pressures of mobile capital; a higher
degree of capital mobility should increase the probability of adopting a ﬂat tax. More
industrialized countries will regard income tax collection as less pertinent than corporate
tax collection because of a larger share of the latter in their revenue structure, and they
could be more willing to risk experimenting with income tax policies; we include industry
as a percentage of GDP (Industry) to control for this. All control variables are lagged,
22since many reforms were introduced January 1, which indicates that policy decisions were
taken the previous year. Furthermore, economic and political conditions, as well as gov-
ernment ideology, usually precede reform measures. Lagging our control variables makes
us reasonably certain that we can make a case for the causal nature of the ﬁndings.
Table Two shows the results of our tests of the standard economic models in the
taxation literature on the probability of ﬂat tax adoption, with ideology and diﬀusion
included.
[TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE]
On their own, few of the economic variables pass the standard cutoﬀs for statistical
signiﬁcance, though capital-account openness shows consistently strong and signiﬁcant
improvements in the likelihood of a country’s adoption of the ﬂat tax in a given year.
Again, including diﬀusion and politics directly into the mix, however, changes the story
somewhat. First, the model ﬁt improves by including the political variables. Second,
both the brute number of champions of the ﬂat tax and the spatial lags, along with
government ideology with respect to economics, are statistically signiﬁcant.
The spatial-autoregressive coeﬃcient, ρ, gives the impact of all other spatial units,
weighted by wi,j, on the outcome in country i; if signiﬁcant, it signals the presence
of diﬀusion eﬀects in the model, but it cannot be directly interpreted.31 We address
this problem and evaluate the spatial interconnectedness and diﬀusion in several ways.
31Franzese & Hays (2003, 2006) suggest the use of spatial multipliers to calculate short term and long
term spatial eﬀects on the basis of the estimated OLS regression model. However, the calculation of such
a multiplier does not translate directly to the logit context — functional form in logit is diﬀerent, non-
linear, and also, while the model with the continuous dependent variable includes the latter both on the
left and right-hand side of the equation (lagged dependent variable), which allows the construction of a
multiplier (see Franzese & Hays 2006, 5-11), in limited dependent variable model the dependent variable
is the probability of an event occurring, while the spatial lag is based on the actual event, which does
not translate into multiplier. At the moment, despite the advances in spatial econometrics in political
science (Franzese & Hays, 2003, 2006) and literature on binary-time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) that
emphasized the ways to address the serial dependence and cross-sectional heterogeneity in the data
(Beck, Katz, Tucker, Jackman, various years), there is no literature on spatial aspects of TSCS data with
a binary dependent variable.
23First, we compare nested and non-nested models to evaluate whether the spatial lag has
signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬂat tax adoption. Second, we estimate Model D from Table 1 as
an ordinary least squares regression, specifying the dependent variable as a top marginal
individual tax rate instead of ﬂat tax change, calculate the multiplier and evaluate short-
term eﬀects. Further research will address the evaluation of spatial interdependence and
diﬀusion, should the analytical solution for binary model becomes available.
Additionally, because it is diﬃcult to interpret the coeﬃcient on the spatial lag di-
rectly, we use the number of ﬂat tax countries in a given year (Diﬀusion) instead, which is
highly correlated with the spatial lag. Recall that only one country had gone ﬂat in 1994,
and two more (all in the Baltics) from 1995 to 2000; the count was ﬁve in 2001-2002,
seven in 2003, and ten in 2004-2005. We estimate the probability of a ﬂat tax policy
change in a non-ﬂat country, depending on the number of ﬂat countries in the region and
changes in governmental ideology. We estimated eﬀects of two hypothetical changes in
government: from the center to the center-left and to the center-right. We shift the value
of ideology from the mean value of 10.4 by one standard deviation above and below this
mean: to the left government (6.48) and to the right government (14.6).
Using the method of ﬁrst diﬀerences and holding all other variables at their mean
values, we estimate that when the center government is replaced by the left one, the
probability of ﬂat tax change in that country decreases by 0.06 (0.05) with three “ﬂat”
neighbors and by 0.15 (0.1) with seven “ﬂat” countries (standard errors in parentheses).
In contrast, when a right party or coalition comes into power, the probability increases by
0.07 (0.03) and by 0.24 (0.21) percent, given three to seven “ﬂat” neighbors. When the
number of ﬂat countries is nine, the ideological change to the left does not decrease the
probability: it goes up by 0.03 (0.03) percent. Likewise, the change to the right, given nine
24“ﬂat” countries, leads to 0.24 (0.21) increase, which is lower than when there are seven
such countries. These results could suggest that the more countries adopt the tax, the
less on the right a government has to be to adopt the reform; if diﬀusion is strong enough,
adopting the ﬂat tax may become more acceptable for center governments. Poland with
its ideology of 12.5 in 2005 comes very close to a predicted implementation of the ﬂat
tax.32
[FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 provides another view of factors aﬀecting tax policy changes. Using Model
C, we estimated the expected probability given increases by one standard deviation in
each predictor from its mean. The Figure plots averaged predicted values, together with
conﬁdence intervals. If interval cross 0-line, the results are not statistically signiﬁcant,
at 0.05 level. This visualization supports our story that radical changes in government
(ideology) and diﬀusion are the strongest factors to explain ﬂat tax revolution: changes
in governmental ideology increase the predicted probability by 29 percent, number of
ﬂat countries: by 36 percent, capital openness and FDI competition also have signiﬁcant
eﬀects.
We stipulated that the increases in FDI inﬂows into ‘ﬂat’ countries make the latter
more attractive for their neighbors, and thus raise the probability of tax policy change
in the latter. We can evaluate whether the spatial lag weighted by FDI inﬂows into ﬂat
countries has eﬀects independent from the eﬀects of FDI and spatial lag variables. In
Table 1, Model A includes only the FDI variable, B includes a spatial lag, and C both
of the former and spatial, FDI-weighted lag. We performed a likelihood-ratio test and
obtained a highly signiﬁcant χ-squared of 32.3, which suggests that the increases in FDI
32That said, running predicted probabilities for Poland adopting the ﬂat tax in 2005 gives a prognosis
of only 14 percent; see the conclusion for details.
25inﬂows in ﬂat neighboring countries aﬀects the probability of ﬂat tax change for their
neighbors.
All ﬂat tax policy changes not only radically simpliﬁed taxation and “ﬂattened” the
rates, but also reduced taxes considerably: on average, ﬂat countries impose 30.5 percent
of top marginal individual tax rate, while non-ﬂat do 38 percent. Because we can estimate
the eﬀects of spatial lag in OLS regression model, we specify model D as the OLS regres-
sion and use the same variables to predict individual tax rates. Parameters that reduce
tax rates should be associated with those increasing the probability of ﬂat tax adoption.
The estimate of the spatial-lag coeﬃcient in the base model is statistically signiﬁcantly
positive. The spatial multiplier, (I − ρW)−1 (Franzese & Hays 2006, 7-12) captures the
eﬀects from one Eastern European country on others closest to it, from those — on their
neighboring countries, including back on that country. Multiplying (I −ρW)−1 by a 20x1
column-vector with 0 in all rows except for example, Lithuania, which receives a 1, pro-
duces a 20x1 vector that contains the estimated eﬀects of a unit-shock (1 percent change
in taxation) in Estonia on the other 19 countries in their rows. We estimated standard
errors via statistical simulation. The resulting matrix provides the estimated eﬀects of a
unit-shock to country i on tax policies in the other 19 countries j.
[TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 reports the short-run spatial eﬀects of marginal individual tax rates in Eastern
Europe. The ﬁrst number in each cell is the immediate eﬀect of a unit-increase (1 percent)
in the column country’s top marginal individual tax rate on other Eastern European
nations (rows). The results suggest that a change in taxation levels in a “ﬂat” country
leads to a reduction in taxation in other countries. For example, decrease in taxation in
Estonia brings about immediate tax changes in Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia.
26The eﬀects are quite small because we estimated the short-run eﬀects, we expect them
to be larger in the steady state.
Finally, how does our model fare in terms of forecasting and reliability? As might be
expected from such a rare event, it puts the probability of Estonia’s adopting the ﬂat tax
in 1994 at .01. Russia’s probability of ﬂat tax adoption in 2001 is .39; Albania’s for 2005
is also .39, Romania’s is .17, and Georgia’s is .99. The erratic nature of these predictions
indicate that there is still much to be done in terms of model speciﬁcation. That said, we
might mention that the predicted probability for all countries in our sample of adopting
the ﬂat tax in 2005 is 75 percent. Overall, the model predicts 72.8 percent of observations
correctly: if Pr > 0.5 and y is 1, and if Pr < 0.5 and y = 0.
5 Conclusion
We hope to have demonstrated that, when it comes to extraordinary politics, economic
forces – either domestic or international – do not seem to be suﬃcient to get reform oﬀ
the ground. In the presence of the right ideological environment, rational policymakers
learn from other countries’ successes with the ﬂat tax and move to adopt the reform
themselves. Both political constraints and peer pressure from neighboring countries are
a powerful inﬂuence.
If diﬀusion is a strong force, though, it provokes an interesting policy question: though
we have shown diﬀusion to matter intraregionally, could the ﬂat tax revolution jump over
to Western Europe as well? Eastern European countries for the most part kicked oﬀ the
1990s with ambitious reform agendas to reshape and open their economies. Policy reform
in the West may be more diﬃcult. But competition from the East may prove too strong
a force. As Estonian Prime Minister Laar put it, “if ‘old Europe’ is to compete eﬀectively
27with ‘new Europe,’ it will have to lower taxes and rethink the social-welfare systems
that high taxation support.” Although the welfare state is considered to be a core part
of European identity, despite its unsustainability and its drag on European competitive-
ness, enlargement might prove a powerful catalyst for reform.33 Again, this may prove
politically diﬃcult to push through Brussels, because of the unanimity requirement in
any change in formal tax matters (according to Articles 94 and 95.2 of the EC Treaty).
That said, the initial conditions are far from analogous, as Eastern Europe had an
unusually mercurial policy environment and a glaring need for reform. Furthermore,
the costs to Western European governments of adopting the tax are far greater than to
Eastern European ones. Recall the case of Kirchhof: the cost of his even mentioning
the ﬂat tax might have been so huge that he had to be quarantined from politics. If we
were to include Western Europe in future analyses, it would be necessary to model the
heterogeneity between the beneﬁts and costs to each government, taking into account
that the costs were relatively trivial for Eastern Europe and that the potential beneﬁts
(particularly with respect to tax collection) were high. Western Europe’s welfare states
and path dependency would give it a rather diﬀerent cost function.
What is required at this stage is a more complete articulation of the political mecha-
nism through which neighbor inﬂuence works. We have shown that competition for invest-
ment does not suﬃce. It is possible that empirics would be less illuminating than formal
theory. Work on collective action (Kuran, 1991) or information cascades (Lohmann, 2000)
might be useful here, though those models usually require either that one outcome be
truly optimal, or that most actors share, but suppress, a preference for a particular kind
of outcome. As such, the parallels may be in policy reform more generally, such as the
33Hans H.J. Labohm. TSC Daily. “The Cradle of the European Tax Rebelion: Estonia.” 13 Oct 2004.
Available at http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=101304A
28spread of school vouchers in the United States. It is crucial to identify what, exactly, is
crossing borders here: if it is not competition for investment per se, it may be an idea.
For now, however, we hope to have shown that reformer governments rationally factor
in cross-border pressures in the political economy of policymaking, at least in this region
and with this reform.
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liberalization (.57) (.65) (.77) (.48)
Price -.0002 -.0008 -.002 -.001
liberalization (.002) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Institutional .002 -.003 .004 -.02
reform (.05) (.06) (.06) (.03)
Capital-account 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.12** -1.16***
openness (.27) (.35) (.37) (.22)
Political -.17 -.44 -.72 7.68*
constraints (2.06) (2.04) (2.56) (3.17)
Ideology .36*** .48* .53** -.15**
(.13) (.26) (.27) (.07)
Diﬀusion 16.5*** 15.57*** 14.59** -
(1.93) (2.48) (2.71)
Distance from .002** .002* .002* .004***
Rhein (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
FDI -.95 -.89 -.58 -3.06**
competition (.63) (1.05) (1.02) (.61)
Spatial lag - 13.06 -4.92 .11*
(unweighted) (8.16) (12.14) (.07)
Spatial lag - - 5.2** -
(FDI-weighted) (2.30)
Pseudo-R2 .69 .81 .82 †.51
Log-Likelihood -38.53 -23.47 -22.47 †P > F =.000
Dependent variable is adoption of the ﬂat tax for a given country year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Logit estimation via multiple imputation, with ﬁxed eﬀects for year, temporal controls and the lagged
dependent variable are omitted. N=300. Pseudo-R2 and log-likelihood are calculated from one single
dataset, multiple imputation does not report them. *Signiﬁcant at p<.10 level, **signiﬁcant at p<.05
level, ***signiﬁcant at p<.001 level. †OLS regression, dependent variable is the top marginal individual
tax rate, same model speciﬁcation as in Models A–C.
37Table 2: Traditional Taxation Models Plus Diﬀusion and Ideology
Variable E. F. G. H.
Constant -15.35** -33.21*** -31.38*** -32.94***
(6.62) (8.3) (8.78) (10.53)
Percent .51* .40 .35 .41
elderly (.27) (.28) (.30) (.31)
Public Debt .11 .08 .04 .04
(.08) (.09) (.11) (.11)
Growth .08 .08 .11 .16*
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.09)
Income -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Trade .008 -.0001 -.008 -.014
(.01) (.01) (.15) (.02)
Industry -.024 .022 .001 -.027
(.11) (.14) (.15) (.19)
Unemployment .003 -.01 -.003 .01
(.08) (.08) (.09) (.09)
Political - -.05 -.58 -1.2
constraints (1.8) (2.1) (2.1)
Capital-account .93*** .99*** .96** 1.05**
openness (.26) (.30) (.31) (.36)
FDI -.61 -.76 -.58 -.33
competition (.42) (.54) (.68) (.76)
Diﬀusion - 16.71*** 16.11*** 15.58***
(2.03) (2.7) (2.25)
Ideology - .28** .36** .44**
(.10) (.15) (.21)
Spatial lag - - 8.71** -9.90
(unweighted) (4.8) (8.2)
Spatial lag - - - 5.5**
(FDI-weighted) (2.2)
Pseudo-R2 .66 .70 .74 .78
Log-Likelihood -42.62 -37.85 -31.81 -28.38
Dependent variable is adoption of the ﬂat tax for a given country year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Logit estimation via multiple imputation with ﬁxed eﬀects for year, temporal controls and the lagged
dependent variable are omitted. N=300. Pseudo-R2 and log-likelihood are calculated from one single
dataset, multiple imputation does not report them. *Signiﬁcant at p<.10 level, **signiﬁcant at p<.05





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Figure 1: Individual Tax Rates in Eastern Europe, 2005
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